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Essay
The (Joseph) Stories of Newmyer and Cover:
Hero or Tragedy?
JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN
Kent Newmyer’s classics Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of
the Old Republic and John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court are
important stories about the architects and heroes of the rule of law in America. In
Newmyer’s account, Story played a crucial role preserving the republic and
building a legal nation out of rival states, and Newmyer’s Story is fundamentally
important for students of American history. But in Robert Cover’s account in
Justice Accused on northern judges’ deference to slavery, Story is an anti-hero.
Sometimes Story stayed silent. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Story overvalued
formalistic comity. This Essay suggests that Story missed vital opportunities to
write a judicial opinion more forcefully recognizing the rights of fugitive slaves
under the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, a preview of Dred Scott but in
reverse.
One can find a balance between Newmyer’s empathetic charity and Cover’s
non-empathetic clarity, to see the value of the rule of law through both
interpretations. Thus, they both teach us about law, leadership, and life.
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The (Joseph) Stories of Newmyer and Cover:
Hero or Tragedy?
JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN *
“As [Justice Oliver Wendell] Holmes put it, ‘[Justice Joseph Story]
has done more than any other English-speaking man in this century to
make the law luminous and easy to understand.’”1 R. Kent Newmyer
brings in this apt description in his epilogue to Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic.2 It’s all the more appropriate
on this occasion because Newmyer makes his subjects—America’s great
justices—luminous, and makes their decisions, their complex ideas, and
their legacies easy to understand.
Newmyer does not achieve luminosity by oversimplifying these men
or the law they made. He grapples with their complexities and
contradictions, but he also has a gift for context and for humanizing these
jurist giants in black robes. Newmyer hails Chief Justice John Marshall as
a hero in a heroic age, and then nails Chief Justice Roger Taney as a villain
in a villainous age. His books John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the
Supreme Court3 and The Supreme Court Under Marshall and Taney4 are
legal history classics, insightfully synthesizing for lawyers, and readably
familiarizing for non-lawyers (and without overly lionizing). But
Newmyer’s best work is Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of
the Old Republic (1985).5
Yale History PhDs have been handing down from generation to
generation a model reading list for our third-year oral examinations. There
are many outstanding legal historians with long careers and only one book
on the list; many more aspire to have one book on the list. Newmyer is a
member of a small club with multiple books on that list, and they deserve
to be on it for any student who wants to understand law, politics, and
culture from the Founding to the Civil War. Newmyer shows how

*
Professor, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Mary Bilder and Steven Wilf for wonderful
contributions and to Kent Newmyer for the inspiration.
1
R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC 383 (G. Edward White ed., 1985).
2
Id.
3
R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT (2001).
4
R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY (1968).
5
NEWMYER, supra note 1.
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biography is a powerful way to understand how those forces shaped
Americans’ lived experiences and American law.
Biography is also enormously challenging. It is one thing to construct a
book around an argument, and to pick and choose discrete moments to
make such a book manageable. But constructing a book around a person
imposes a duty to capture both the whole person and the world around
them—over many decades. He opens his book with an anecdote from the
archives, where a “bedraggled” old man confronted him about working on
a Story biography.6 “Young man . . . studying Joseph Story could ruin your
career!”7
Instead, Newmyer dug deep into Story’s life, and in turn, Story
propelled Newmyer on a start of an illustrious career. How did he avoid the
pitfalls of biography? I offer two observations. First, Newmyer had a
thesis: he relied on Story’s life to trace civic republicanism’s journey in
America from anti-imperial revolution to nationalistic conservatism.8 It’s a
story that explains some puzzles and surprises in American history: why
and how the Revolution happened; why the early republic—as it grew to
span a continent and increasingly depended on slavery and immigration—
did not fracture across party lines or geographic lines for so long; why
elites failed to confront slavery for so long; and after Story’s death, why
northern elites did not simply wave goodbye when the South seceded.
Newmyer was writing in the midst of American historians doing the best
work on republicanism in the Atlantic world, and he drew on those insights
to drive a big biography with some big ideas. Newmyer also addressed one
of the problems with this historiography. One critique is that these
historians made civic republicanism too abstract, and not concrete or
human enough. It’s hard for judges to interpret law through the civic
republican turn if the ideas are vague. But Newmyer’s biography
succeeded in making these ideas more comprehensible, which in turn helps
scholars and judges understand constitutional history.
A second observation about biography is that it helps to have an
emotional connection to the subject. The history profession’s old goal of
“objectivity” is not only a fantasy (that “noble dream”9), but it can also
drag down a project. It seemed to me—and I am speculating—that
Newmyer succeeded because he grew to love and sympathize with Joseph
Story. The story of civic republicanism and conservative capitalist
nationalism comes alive because Newmyer wanted to bring Story to life.

6

Id. at ix.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
8
Id. at xv–xvi.
9
See, e.g., PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 1–3 (1988) (discussing the goal of objectivity among historians).
7
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Another great legal scholar who studied Story shows the power of the
opposite emotional approach. Robert Cover wrote the seminal Justice
Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process10 coming out of the civil
rights era and Vietnam era with intensely negative feelings towards the
antebellum judges who knew that slavery was wrong, but used formalism
and procedure to avoid confronting or combatting slavery. It would be
unfair to contrast Cover as having enmity for Story, as opposed to
Newmyer’s empathy; to suggest villain versus hero. But it is fair to say that
Cover is driven by moral outrage over the retreat to formalism in order to
hide from conscience. It may be fair to contrast Newmyer’s
Story-as-tragic-hero versus Cover’s Story-as-anti-hero (a Cover Story?
Sorry.).
Here is a concise summary of Cover’s account: Story was a pioneer in
conflict-of-laws and comity (one jurisdiction recognizing the different
rules of another jurisdiction). Story wrote that only “natural” qualifications
and disqualifications deserved comity.11 Cover wrote, “[S]lavery was his
primary illustration for this principle” when Story wrote in 1834.12 Cover
then tells a story of a series of cases in which Story condemns slavery
either through his adoption of precedents in his legal publications (such as
Lord Mansfield’s Somerset decision against slavery’s legality in
England)13 or in his decisions. Both Cover and Newmyer emphasize his
anti-slavery opinion in La Jeune Eugenie while riding circuit in 1822.
Story does not hold back on the evils:
What is the fact as to the ordinary, nay, necessary course, of
this trade? It begins in corruption, and plunder, and
kidnapping. It creates and stimulates unholy wars for the
purpose of making captives. It desolates whole villages and
provinces for the purpose of seizing the young, the feeble, the
defenceless, and the innocent. It breaks down all the ties of
parent, and children, and family, and country. It shuts up all
sympathy for human suffering and sorrows. It manacles the
inoffensive females and the starving infants. It forces the
brave to untimely death in defence of their humble homes
and firesides, or drives them to despair and self-immolation.
It stirs up the worst passions of the human soul, darkening
the spirit of revenge, sharpening the greediness of avarice,
brutalizing the selfish, envenoming the cruel, famishing the

10

ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
Id. at 86.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 87.
11
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weak, and crushing to death the broken-hearted. This is but
the beginning of the evils.14
Cover highlights Story’s bigger picture jurisprudential point: “the
nature of moral obligation, may theoretically be said to exist in the law of
nations,”15 meaning the natural law of freedom should be read into
international law. Thus, Story ruled against the slave trade.16
But then Story’s results are more mixed. In Antelope in 1825, Chief
Justice John Marshall ruled the opposite way in favor of the slave trade,
relying on positive law that creates slavery, rather than natural law that
would limit it.17 Newmyer, not Cover, notes that Story “entered no dissent”
in Antelope.18 Newmyer puts his emphasis on the legacy of the earlier
anti-slavery opinion: “Story, at any rate, never changed his mind on the
correctness of his Eugenie doctrine, Marshall and The Antelope
notwithstanding.”19 Notwithstanding? Marshall’s decision in Antelope may
not have formally overturned La Jeune Eugenie, but it sharply limited it.
Yet Story failed to dissent.20
After more time passed, in the 1841 case Amistad, Story ruled in favor
of freeing slaves who had mutinied on board slave ships and eventually
landed in New York.21 Both Cover and Newmyer mildly praised Story’s
role.22 But both authors underscored that Story again relied on positive
“municipal law,” the narrower fact that Spain abolished slavery, rather than
broader human rights against slavery.23 Both Cover and Newmyer criticize
Story’s narrow and increasingly positivistic position.24 Interestingly,
Newmyer devotes time to explaining why political events constrained
Story’s latitude (more sympathetically to Story’s political challenges).25
But Newmyer also criticized Story’s approach to find a way to rule in
favor of both sides, calling it “bad faith.”26 On a more positive note, he also
goes on to explain how another court that same year relied on Story’s
earlier decisions on conflict-of-laws (including Amistad) to free slaves who
had mutinied.27 Amistad is a celebrated case, but to his credit Newmyer is
14

United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 845 (D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
Id. at 846.
16
Id.
17
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 90 (1825).
18
NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 348.
19
Id. at 350.
20
Id.
21
United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 588, 597 (1841).
22
COVER, supra note 10, at 114–15; NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 369. Poetically, the case title
means United States v. Friendship, a bit like the later case, Virginia v. Loving.
23
COVER, supra note 10, at 114; NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 369.
24
COVER, supra note 10, at 115; NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 369.
25
NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 369.
26
Id.
27
Id.
15
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balanced and more critical of Story than our popular culture might have
expected.
Another 1841 slavery controversy, Groves v. Slaughter,28 again
challenged Story’s moral position. Mississippi’s Constitution prohibited
importing slaves for sale.29 Slaughter had sold imported slaves in
Mississippi, but the buyers refused to pay because they claimed the illegal
sale was unenforceable.30 Justice Smith Thompson, writing for the
majority, held that the state constitutional provision by itself was not
self-executing, and because the legislature had not passed legislation to
implement it, it was unenforceable.31 Justice John McLean, more strongly
than ever announcing his anti-slavery views, concurred for a different
reason: the contract was unenforceable because trafficking humans was a
creature of local law and, therefore, not enforceable.32 Other Justices took
the opportunity to write more stridently pro-slavery decisions: Chief
Justice Roger Taney invoked states’ rights to deny any federal role to
regulate slavery,33 and Justice Henry Baldwin made a mirror image
argument that the Fifth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause protected slave owners’ rights and should invalidate the state
constitutional amendment.34 Taney would later adopt Baldwin’s argument
and recognize a substantive due process right for slave owners in Dred
Scott v. Sandford.35
But Story weighed in on none of these positions, because he voted to
concur while issuing no opinion of his own.36 Story had an opportunity to
stand with McLean against slavery by invoking constitutional clauses for
slaves, not their owners. But he never did. And his concurrence signaled
his approval for the states’ rights approach. Surprisingly, neither Cover nor
Newmyer focused on his silence or criticized him for missing an
opportunity to speak out on his anti-slavery views.37
This now brings us to the most controversial case in this line of
fugitive slaves and personal liberty laws cases: Prigg v. Pennsylvania.38
Pennsylvania state law prohibited blacks from being removed,39 but Justice
Story ruled for a majority that the federal Fugitive Slave Law preempted
28

Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449 (1841).
Id. at 449.
30
Id. at 455.
31
Id. at 501–02.
32
Id. at 506–08.
33
Id. at 508.
34
Id. at 515–17.
35
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 451–54 (1856).
36
Groves, 40 U.S. at 510 (Story, J., concurring).
37
See COVER, supra note 10; NEWMYER, supra note 1 (discussing Justice Story without
criticizing him for a missed opportunity to speak out on his anti-slavery views).
38
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
39
Id. at 539.
29
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the state anti-slavery law. At the same time, Story’s decision gave states
latitude to pass new statutes that would forbid state officials from
cooperating in the return of fugitive slaves. Over time, Story had become
increasingly formalistic and curtailed his earlier efforts.
Robert Cover unsurprisingly focused on Story’s decision as a
paradigmatic example judge putting formalism over fairness.41 Story was
an expert in comity, and he couldn’t craft a way for the state statute to
survive? Especially given how he had written before about freedom and
natural law prevailing over slavery and positive law? Story and the
majority overstated how crucial the Fugitive Slave clause was in the
Constitutional Convention for keeping the South on board, as if it were the
dealmaker or deal breaker. Cover writes with implicit irony that Cover
viewed the acceptance of the Fugitive Slave clause as “a test of the good
faith of the participants in the national undertaking,”42 if the Justices were
going to stick to the exaggerated bargain of 1787 in order to keep the
nation together. Cover writes:
Story’s role in Prigg v. Pennsylvania is more difficult to
fathom. . . . What was new in Prigg was Story’s very weak
reasoning that the prohibition of the “discharge” of a fugitive
in Article IV [of the Constitution] must be interpreted to
exclude any interposition of process that might operate to
“delay” or “qualify” the enjoyment of the right protected.
Such word teasing was especially unconvincing in light of
McLean’s dissent that included a forceful policy attack
against self-help.43
“[W]ord teasing” is a generous way to phrase it. Here is the text of the
Fugitive Slave clause:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of
any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.44
“Discharge” meant the final freeing of a slave. Surely, a state
providing protective measures to confirm a suspected fugitive’s identity
would neither mean “discharge” nor be a failure to “deliver.” Providing
extra process under state law could have been read to be consistent with
40

Id. at 625–26.
See COVER, supra note 10, at 166–67 (illustrating how Justice Story decided the case).
42
Id. at 240.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 162.
41
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the clause, or at least using the canon of constitutional avoidance, the
Supreme Court could have interpreted the clause to be only delay, and not
discharge. Moreover, note the clause’s use of the word “due,” which hints
at the “due process” clause. How is a state supposed to know to whom
such service is due, unless it pursues due process with concrete steps?
Would that still be a conflict of law? Preemption was not so developed in
the nineteenth century, and it certainly was not so iron-clad and concrete a
doctrine that Story couldn’t find a way to salvage some of the state
Personal Freedom provisions.
Finally, this point about that small word “due” raises a question that is
not addressed in any of the Prigg opinions, nor by Cover or Newmyer: if
just a year earlier, the pro-slavery Justices invoked the Fifth Amendment
for slave-owners in Groves v. Slaughter, why not invoke it for the slaves
themselves in Prigg? The claims by fugitive slaves for procedural
protections under state law are more “process” than the arguably
oxymoronic invocation of substantive due process for slave-owners by
Justice Baldwin in Groves.45 In fact, one of the most flagrantly egregiously
unfair aspects of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 (an act shaped by Prigg)
was that it paid commissioners twice as much to rule that the suspect was a
fugitive rather than free. Imagine if somehow Justices Story and McLean
had announced in some format—not necessarily a majority opinion, but
just a concurrence or a dissent—the plausibility of a due process claim for
suspected fugitives. It clearly fit the constitutional text “due” in both
Article IV and in the Fifth Amendment. It was at least a missed
opportunity for Justice Story to voice his conscience, while also exhibiting
a brilliant and creative legal mind. The fact that he did not attempt such an
argument is also a hint that he was seeking political compromise, not legal
protection.
Newmyer is more generous and sympathetic. He takes Story seriously,
as a realistic nationalist seeking compromise, and as someone who knows a
forceful dissent or a clever concurrence does not make law or concrete
change. Newmyer is also sharply critical: “‘Masks of the law are of two
kinds,’ according to John Noonan, Jr., ‘those imposed on others and those
put on oneself.’”46 This critique is consistent with Cover’s thesis about
American judges setting aside their own consciences to adopt the formalist
role of a judge: putting a mask of performative, professional formalism on
oneself to cover over a more human moral sense. I have relied on these
concepts of role fidelity in my own work in legal history and torts.47
Newmyer is insightful in his own critique of Story’s opinion, noting
45

Groves, 40 U.S. at 515.
NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 370 (citation omitted).
47
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and
American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 1355 (2010).
46
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Story’s “failure to distinguish between state law applying to fugitive slaves
and those applying to free blacks was crucial.”48 Story’s defense, that states
could order their officials not to assist, seems more like a
conscience-soothing boycott to keep one’s hands clean, rather than get
one’s hands dirty in the work of justice and resistance.
It’s more like the midwestern bloc of the Republican coalition that
joined with Lincoln not because of abolition and more because of
anti-expansion: they did not want slavery—and specifically African
slaves— moving near them, competing against them at lower cost, and
devaluing their own labor.49 Story offered Northerners the chance to
boycott and free their conscience, but at the cost of the state power to resist
and free humans.50 Story doesn’t acknowledge the hypocrisy of the South
asserting states’ rights to protect slavery while demanding federal judicial
power to allow them to override states’ rights and, as slavecatcher, ride
into northern states.
Newmyer gives Story and his son several pages and a lot of latitude to
justify the decision, even if Newmyer adds his skepticism to these
justifications:
The complication comes from what Story himself (and his
son, too) thought he had accomplished. Upon his return to
Massachusetts in the spring of 1842, he spoke of his opinion
in Prigg “repeatedly and earnestly” to his family and friends
as a “triumph of freedom.”51
To his credit, Newmyer sharply contrasts what Story did and what he
says he did. Newmyer is rightly skeptical. But Newmyer’s telling comes
across as Story’s confusion or self-delusion. It is worth contemplating if
Story was acting in good or bad faith, that he knew he had compromised
not only politically but in the gravest moral sense, and was desperate to tell
others and himself it was not betrayal. This is more than a
“complication,”52 more like a moral crisis that Cover sees.
And this is a challenge in biography. How much should an author
credit their subjects for how they see themselves and describe themselves
to the world? How much should the author generously interpret them as
operating in good faith, or critically in bad faith? There is no sign that
Story was in cognitive or emotional decline in 1842. But it’s hard to read
his Prigg opinion and then his own celebration of it as a “triumph of
48

NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 373–74.
ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 3–4 (1970).
50
NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 373–74.
51
NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 372.
52
Id.
49
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freedom,” and not instead see a tragedy for freedom, a tragedy of regret
and guilt, of a judicial career built on pursuing justice and fairness, and to
then realize on some haunting level that all those years of work and genius
led him to a zenith in the legal triumph for slave hunters. Story sacrificed
his principles of freedom for nationalism and comity, but he died before he
could see how all these compromises—including the spreading conflict
over fugitive slaves and slave hunters—still tore the country apart into civil
war.54
In light of these deep failings by Story in Prigg and missed
opportunities in Antelope, Groves, and Amistad, how should we think of
Story? Is Cover right in Justice Accused to make it partially “Story
Accused”? Cover may have been too cynical, but it is key to understand
that Cover’s thesis is not about lying and deception. He is making a deeper
point about the banality of evil. Judges like Story enabled the evil of
slavery by conceiving of their role as juridical bureaucrat. And this may be
an implicit or unintentional critique in Newmyer’s title. Whereas Arendt’s
bureaucrat can enable evil through role fidelity triumphing over
conscience, so too can Newmyer’s statesman participate in “heroic” evil.
The goals may be noble: the rule of law, stability, compromise. But by
putting on the mask of “statesman” and “hero,” what evils are our leaders
enabling? Are they compromising our most basic principles for their heroic
legacy?
Perhaps the bottom line is to find a balance between Newmyer’s
empathetic charity and Cover’s non-empathetic clarity. And perhaps a
bottom line today is that the rule of law is just as important as ever. It
depends on being wise and reflective about how the rule of law is
constructed and whom it is supposed to serve. In the 2020s, it is more
difficult to see Story’s core value of “nationalism” as a noble or heroic
principle worth sacrificing fellow humans’ life and liberty, and worth
sacrificing the civic republican ideals that first propelled Story to
greatness.
A final bottom line is that we can engage in these debates to help us
understand our current crisis of republicanism and the rule of law vs.
nationalism, our current crisis of statesmen vs. demagogues, because we
have learned so much from outstanding and thoughtful legal scholars like
Robert Cover and Kent Newmyer.

53

Id.
See A Man of Letters: Joseph Story (1775-1845), HARV. L. TODAY (Oct. 1, 2012),
https://today.law.harvard.edu/a-man-of-letters-joseph-story/ (noting Story’s death year); Dr. James
McPherson, A Brief Overview of the American Civil War, AM. BATTLEFIELD TR.,
https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/brief-overview-american-civil-war (noting the date of the
start of the Civil War) (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
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Kent, thank you for your expert craft of biography, and through
biography, thank you for teaching us about law, leadership, and life.

